We address the cryptographic topic of proxy re-encryption (PRE), which is a special public-key cryptosystem. A PRE scheme allows a special entity, known as the proxy, to transform a message encrypted with the public key of a delegator (say Alice), into a new ciphertext that is protected under the public key of a delegatee (say Bob), and thus the same message can then be recovered with Bob's private key. In this paper, in the identity-based setting, we first investigate the relationship between so called mediated encryption and unidirectional PRE. We provide a general framework which converts any secure identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme into a secure identity-based mediated encryption scheme, and vice versa. Concerning the security for unidirectional PRE schemes, Ateniese et al. previously suggested an important property known as the master secret security, which requires that the coalition of the proxy and Bob cannot expose Alice's private key. In this paper, we extend the notion to the identity-based setting, and present an identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme, which not only is provably secure against the chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model but also achieves the master secret security at the same time.
Introduction
In this paper, we are concerned with the identitybased encryption (IBE), a special kind of public-key cryptosystem where any user's public key can be directly derived from his unique identifier like his user name or email address. The concept of IBE was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [1] as an effort to reduce the operation requirement on the public key infrastructure (PKI). By mapping a well-known and unique aspect of a client's identity to his public key, IBE simplifies the system management, as the certification involved in the traditional PKI now becomes implicit. That is, a message sender no longer needs to check whether the intended recipient is certified or not; instead, prior to decryption, the recipient must identify himself to a trusted authority for a designated private key corresponding to his identity.
Since the pioneering work [1] , identity-based cryptography has received more and more research interest. Many IBE schemes have been proposed [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , but a noticeable problem lies in that none of them can provide an efficient solution to user identity revocation. In such an identity-based setting, we respectively introduce two related topics of particular interest in this paper: mediated encryption (mE) and proxy re-encryption (PRE). The relationship between the involved cryptographic domains is illustrated in Fig.1 .
Identity-Based Mediated Encryption
Mediated Encryption. In the conventional PKI, efficient revocation of public key certificates has been a non-trivial task. In 2001, Boneh et al. [8] introduced mediated cryptography as an approach to instantaneous revocation of public keys. The basic idea is to employ an online semi-trusted mediator (SEM) to provide the security control for transactions. Once the SEM is notified that a user's key is to be revoked, its use can be immediately banned. Particularly, the proposed mRSA [8] is a simple and practical method of splitting an RSA private key between the user and an SEM, which enables fast and fine-grained control of users' security privileges. Their idea of mediated cryptography [8] has then motivated research on mediated IBE briefly reviewed as follows. 
Identity-Based Mediated Encryption.
In the literature, many IBE schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] have been proposed, but none of them provides an efficient solution to identity revocation. Since IBE eliminates the use of traditional public key certificates (which have been employed to indicate the validity of the corresponding keys), no revocation of user identities inherently implies no revocation of user keys, which may be understood as an undesirable drawback of the identity-based cryptography compared with the traditional PKI solution.
Concerning the fact that mRSA [8] still relies on conventional certificates to store and communicate public keys, Ding and Tsudik [9] transformed mRSA into an identity-based mediated RSA (IB-mRSA) scheme [9] , which is an initiative towards addressing the challenge of user key revocation in IBE. Although IB-mRSA offers remarkable performance and practicality, a common RSA modulus is shared among all users in the system. As a result, to guarantee the security of IB-mRSA, the private key of the SEM has to be well protected throughout the entire system lifetime, which seems a bit too risky since the SEM in nature is only a semitrusted mediator.
Later, based on an IBE scheme proposed by Boneh and Franklin [2] , Libert and Quisquater proposed a new mediated IBE scheme [10] . Although the scheme [10] does not exhibit the critical security dependence observed in Ding and Tsudik's IB-mRSA [9] , it turns out to be vulnerable to the chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) by an inner adversary (i.e., a malicious client who possesses the user part of the private key). In other words, the system security is still highly dependent; compared to IB-mRSA [9] , the prohibitive trust is just shifted from the mediator side to the user side.
Recently, Baek and Zheng [11] presented yet another mediated IBE scheme, which is secure against the chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model [12] but in a strong sense, that is, secure against CCA even conducted by an attacker who has obtained the user part of a private key.
Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy Re-Encryption. In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [13] introduced the concept of proxy reencryption (PRE), in which a semi-trusted entity known as the proxy, not necessarily knowing the underlying plaintext message, converts a ciphertext intended for Alice into another ciphertext intended for Bob. They also proposed the first proxy re-encryption scheme, which we shall refer to as the BBS scheme.
A PRE scheme may be either bidirectional (i.e., twoway) or unidirectional (i.e., one-way). The underlying construction in the BBS scheme [13] falls into the former case: the cryptographic information for transforming the ciphertext from for Alice to for Bob can also be employed to transform the ciphertext from for Bob to for Alice. However, in reality, the latter (i.e., one-way) case may be more desired, where Alice clearly plays the role of the delegator and Bob plays the exact role of the delegatee, but not vice versa. Such a unidirectional case is considered in this paper, and for brevity we only refer to "PRE" when it is obvious to see from the context that we are referring to the unidirectional case.
Concerning the security for unidirectional PRE schemes, in [14] Ateniese et al. defined an important security requirement. This notion, termed master secret security (MSS), demands that even the coalition of the proxy and the delegatee should not be able to expose the private key of the corresponding delegator. Later we shall show that it is possible to export the concept of MSS to the identity-based setting.
In [14] , Ateniese et al. also showed the first examples of unidirectional PRE schemes based on pairings. They are only resilient to the chosen plaintext attack (CPA), and thus may not be sufficiently secure for practical applications. Canetti and Hohenberger [15] proposed the definition of CCA security for PRE schemes, and demonstrated a scheme that satisfies the definition. However, just like the BBS scheme [13] , their CCA-secure PRE scheme is bidirectional. Libert and Vergnaud [16] generalized Canetti and Hohenberger's work [15] , and proposed the first construction of unidirectional PRE scheme that is CCA-secure in the standard model. More recently, there have been efforts on how to construct a secure PRE scheme without using pairings [17] [18] .
Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption. In [19] , Green and Ateniese addressed the topic of identity-based PRE. Based on Boneh and Franklin's IBE scheme [2] , they proposed the first identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme, which is secure in the random oracle model [12] . Then, Chu and Tzeng [20] proposed an identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme without random oracles. Unfortunately, Shao et al. [21] recently revealed a security flaw in the proposal [20] , and an improvement was also proposed.
This work has also been motivated by existent research on PRE outside the identity-based setting. For example, some [14] are unidirectional but only CPAsecure, while [15] is CCA-secure but bidirectional. Therefore, one of our incentives is to construct a concrete PRE scheme similar to [16] that is both unidirectional and CCA-secure, but in the identity-based setting. In addition, we make an effort to achieve the precious MSS property [14] at the same time.
Contributions and Paper Organization
In this paper, we present two new constructions for identity-based unidirectional proxy re-encryption, a general one and a concrete one, both provably secure. Therefore, our technical contributions are two-fold:
• First, we investigate the relationship between identity-based mediated encryption (IBmE) and identity-based unidirectional PRE (IBPRE). We provide a general framework for protocol conversion, in which a secure IBmE scheme can be constructed from any secure IBPRE scheme, and vice versa (as depicted in Fig.1 ). The conversion itself works in the standard model.
• We then propose the model of master secret security [14] for IBPRE schemes. All existent IBPRE schemes [19] [20] , plus the ones constructed from IBmE schemes following our general conversion, do not obtain this MSS property. Nevertheless, we show it is possible to achieve the property by presenting a concrete IBPRE scheme, which is also CCA-secure in the standard model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents necessary backgrounds like formalized descriptions; readers familiar with a certain topic can skip the corresponding subsection. Our general framework for mutual IBmE-IBPRE conversion and the corresponding security proofs are presented in Section 3. A CCA-secure identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme with master secret security is proposed in Section 4.
Finally, we conclude this work in Section 5 , where an open problem is also presented.
Preliminaries

Pairing
Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups of the same prime order p. A (symmetric) pairing is a function e : G × G → G T with the following properties:
• Bilinearity:
ab ; • Non-degeneracy: if g 1 and g 2 are both generators in G, then e(g 1 , g 2 ) generates G T ;
• Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) for ∀g 1 
The cryptographic pairing is actually a special kind of mapping mathematically known as the bilinear map. In Subsection 4.1, we shall employ a pairing group system p, G, G T , e to construct a concrete IBPRE scheme, whose two security properties shall be formally proved in Subsection 4.2 based on two basic cryptographic assumptions, respectively. Next, we introduce the two assumptions.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption
Following the above notions, let g ∈ G be a generator. Given five elements g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G, and e (g, g) z ∈ G T , where the four secret exponents a, b, c, z are uniformly and randomly selected from Z * p , a fair binary coin β ∈ {0, 1} is flipped to generate a tu-
abc ; otherwise, output T β=0 where T = e(g, g)
z . The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem is to guess the value of β from T β .
Assume A is an algorithm (interchangeably, an adversary) for guessing β. We say A has at least an advantage of in solving the DBDH problem if
where both probabilities are computed with respect to uniformly and randomly chosen a, b, c, z and the random bits consumed by A. Definition 1 (DBDH Assumption). We say that the (t, )-DBDH assumption holds in a group G if no algorithm running in the time of at most t can solve the DBDH problem in G with an advantage of at least .
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
Let G be a multiplicative group of a prime order p, and g be its generator. Given the tuple (g, g a , g b ) for random a, b ∈ Z * p , the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in group G is to compute g ab . We say an adversary A has at least an advantage of in solving the CDH problem if
where the probability is computed with respect to randomly chosen a, b and the random bits consumed by A. Definition 2 (CDH Assumption). We say that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in a group G if no algorithm running in the time of at most t can solve the CDH problem in G with an advantage of at least .
Identity-Based Mediated Encryption
An identity-based mediated encryption (IBmE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms described as follows:
Setup(λ): Taking as input a security parameter λ, it outputs a public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
Extract(PK, MSK, ID): Taking as input PK, the master secret key MSK, and an identity ID, it outputs a private key d ID .
DistributeKey(PK, ID, d ID ): Taking as input PK, an identity ID, and the private key d ID , it outputs the SEMpart private key d ID,sem and the user-part private key d ID,user . Note that the algorithm should be a random one.
Encrypt(PK, ID, m): Taking as input PK, an identity ID, and a message m, it outputs a ciphertext C.
SEMDecrypt(PK, C, ID, d ID,sem ): Taking as input PK, a ciphertext C, an identity ID, and the SEM's private key d ID,sem , it outputs the SEM's decryption share δ C,ID,sem or an error symbol ⊥.
UserDecrypt(PK, C, ID, d ID,user , δ C,ID,sem ): Taking as input PK, a ciphertext C, an identity ID, the user's private key d ID,user , and the SEM's decryption share δ C,ID,sem , it outputs a message m or ⊥. This algorithm should check the validity of the SEM's decryption share before the decryption.
Decrypt(PK, C, ID, d ID ): Taking as input PK, a ciphertext C, an identity ID, and the private key d ID , it outputs a message m or ⊥.
All IBmE schemes should satisfy the correctness condition that decryption "undoes" encryption. The IND-ID-CCA security for IBmE is defined with the following game between an attack algorithm A and a challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(λ) to obtain a public key PK and gives it to the adversary.
Query Phase 1. The adversary A adaptively issues:
• Extraction query, on input an identity ID: the challenger forwards the corresponding private key d ID to the adversary.
• SEMKeyExtraction query, on input an identity ID: the challenger runs the Extract and DistributeKey algorithms to obtain the SEM-part private key d ID,sem and sends it to the adversary.
• UserKeyExtraction query, on input an identity ID: the challenger runs the Extract and DistributeKey algorithms to obtain the user-part private key d ID,user and sends it to the adversary.
• SEMDecryption query, on input an identity ID and a ciphertext C: the challenger runs the SEMDecrypt algorithm, and forwards the partial decryption result to the adversary.
• UserDecryption query, on input an identity ID, a ciphertext C, and the SEM's decryption share δ C,ID,sem : the challenger runs the UserDecrypt algorithm, and forwards the result to the adversary.
• Decryption query, on input an identity ID and a ciphertext C: the challenger runs the Decrypt algorithm, and forwards the result to the adversary.
Challenge. The adversary A selects two plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ) of equal length, and a target identity ID * for which their's is the natural constraint that neither of the following queries has ever been made in Query phase 1:
2) SEMKeyExtraction(ID * ) and UserKey-
The challenger then chooses β
* , m β ), and gives the target ciphertext
Query Phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively issue queries as specified in Phase 1, but none of the following is allowed:
Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess β ∈ {0, 1} for β, and wins the game if β = β .
We define A's advantage in attacking the identitybased mediated encryption system IBmE with parameter λ as 
Definition 3. We say that an identity-based mediated encryption scheme
Identity-Based Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption
An identity-based unidirectional proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms described as follows:
Extract(PK, MSK, ID): Taking as input PK, the master secret key MSK, and a user identity ID, it outputs a user private key d ID .
RKGen(PK, ID All IBPRE schemes should satisfy the correctness condition that decryption "undoes" encryption. The IND-ID-CCA security for IBPRE is defined with the following game between an attack algorithm A and a challenger.
• RKGeneration query, on input two identities ID 1 , ID 2 : the challenger runs the RKGen algorithm to obtain the re-encryption key d ID1→ID2 and sends it to the adversary.
• ReEncryption query, on input two identities ID 1 , ID 2 and a ciphertext C ID 1 : the challenger runs the ReEncrypt algorithm, and sends the re-encrypted ciphertext C ID 2 to the adversary.
Challenge. The adversary A selects two plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ) of equal length, and a target identity ID * for which there is the natural constraint that neither of the following queries has ever been made in Query Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess β ∈ {0, 1} for β and wins the game if β = β .
We define A's advantage in attacking the identitybased proxy re-encryption system IBPRE with parameter λ as is at most . The master secret security (MSS) property that we imported to IBPRE, which is not necessarily implied by the above IND-ID-CCA security, is defined with the following game between an attack algorithm A and a challenger.
Query Phase. The adversary A adaptively issues:
• RKGeneration query, on input two identities ID 1 , ID 2 : the challenger runs the RKGen algorithm to obtain the re-encryption key d ID 1 →ID2 and sends it to the adversary.
Output. 
General Framework for Mutual Conversion
Our general framework for mutual IBmE-IBPRE conversion transforms a secure identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme into a secure identity-based mediated encryption scheme, and vice versa. We now present the two conversions respectively.
From IBPRE to IBmE
Suppose that Π IBPRE is an IBPRE scheme with algorithms Setup, Extract, Encrypt, RKGen, ReEncrypt and Decrypt. We can construct an IBmE scheme Π IBmE by defining the corresponding IBmE algorithms as specified in Subsection 2.4.
IBmE.Setup(λ). For security parameter λ, run (PK, MSK) ← IBPRE.Setup(λ). Let PK be the public key and MSK be the master secret key.
IBmE.Extract(PK, MSK, ID). Given PK, MSK, and an identity ID, run
IBmE.DistributeKey(PK, ID, d ID ). Given PK, an identity ID and the private key
Set the SEM's and user's private keys
IBmE.Encrypt(PK, ID, m). Given PK, an identity ID, and a message m, generate the ciphertext C ← IBPRE.Encrypt(PK, ID 0, m).
IBmE.SEMDecrypt(PK, C, ID, d ID,sem ). Given PK, a ciphertext C, an identity ID, and the SEM's private key d ID,sem = d ID 0→ID 1 , run
Set the SEM's decryption share δ C,ID,sem = C ID 1 .
IBmE.UserDecrypt(PK, C, ID, d ID,user , δ C,ID,sem ). Given PK, a ciphertext C, an identity ID, the user's private key d ID,user = d ID 1 , and the SEM's decryption share δ C,ID,sem = C ID 1 , set
IBmE.Decrypt (PK, C, ID, d ID ) . Given PK, a ciphertext C, an identity ID, and the private key
Clearly, the scheme constructed above satisfies the correctness condition. We now prove its security. 
• UserKeyExtraction query on ID: B makes the Extraction query to C for the identity ID 1 and returns the result to A.
• SEMKeyExtraction query on ID: B makes the RKGeneration query to C for (ID 0, ID 1) and returns the result to A.
• UserDecryption query on (ID, C, δ C,ID,sem ): B makes the Decryption query to C for (ID 1, C ID 1 = δ C,ID,sem ) and returns the result to A.
• SEMDecryption query on (ID, C): B makes the ReEncryption query to C for (ID 0, ID 1, C) and returns the result to A.
• Decryption query on (ID, C): B makes the Decryption query to C for (ID 0, C) and returns the result to A.
Challenge. 
From IBmE to IBPRE
Suppose that Π IBmE is an IBmE scheme with algorithms Setup, Extract, DistributeKey, Encrypt, SEMDecrypt, UserDecrypt and Decrypt. We can construct an IBPRE scheme Π IBPRE by defining the corresponding IBPRE algorithms as specified in Subsection 2.5.
IBPRE.Setup(λ). For security parameter λ, run (PK, MSK) ← IBmE.Setup(λ). Let PK be the public key and MSK be the master secret key.
IBPRE.Extract(PK, MSK, ID). Given PK, MSK, and a user identity ID, set the user's private key d ID ← IBmE.Extract(PK, MSK, ID).
IBPRE.Encrypt(PK, ID, m). Given PK, an identity ID, and a message m, generate the ciphertext C ← IBmE.Encrypt(PK, ID, m 0).
. Given PK, two identities ID 1 , ID 2 , and the private key
. Set the re-encryption key
Given PK, a re-encryption key d
. Given PK, a ciphertext C ID 2 , an identity ID 2 , and the private key
Note that an extra bit is appended to the message in order to distinguish between the encryption in IBPRE.Encrypt and the encryption in IBPRE.RKGen and IBPRE.ReEncrypt. To map m 0, d ID 1 ,user 1 and δ C ID 1 ,ID1,sem 1 to the message space of Π IBmE , an efficient encoding algorithm and the corresponding decoding algorithm may be required.
and K is a random element, and adds the record (ID 1 = ID * , C ID 1 , K) into the CHK-list; else B makes the UserKeyExtraction query to C for the identity ID 1 , gets d ID 1 ,user , makes the SEMDecryption query to C for (ID 1 , C ID 1 ) to get δ C ID 1 ,ID1,sem , and sends 2) If C ID 2 is a re-encrypted ciphertext, let C ID 2 = (C ID 1 , C δ , C K ) . B makes the Decryption query to C for (ID 2 , C δ ) and ( 
CCA-Secure IBPRE Scheme with MSS
In this section, based on Waters' IBE scheme [5] which is only CPA-secure, we propose a concrete IBPRE scheme that is IND-ID-CCA secure in the standard model. This security is achieved owning to employing the "direct chosen-ciphertext secure" technique from [22] . At the same time, inspired by [23] [24] , we construct the scheme in a particular manner that the favorable master secret security (MSS) is also achieved.
Protocol Description
As introduced in Subsection 2.5, our IBPRE scheme consists of six algorithms.
Setup(λ). Given the security parameter λ, we choose an appropriate pairing group system p, G, G T , e . Let g be a generator of G. Randomly select α ∈ Z p and let g 1 = g α . Assume all entity identities are represented as bit strings of length n, a separate parameter independent of p. Then, choose random elements g 2 , u 1 , u 1,1 , . . . , u 1,n , u 2 ,  u 2,1 , . . ., u 2,n , u 3 , u 3,1 , . . ., u 3 
n be a secure one-way hash function and E : {0, 1} * → G T be an encoding algorithm. The system master secret key is defined as MSK = g α 2 . Let the following tuple be the public key PK: e, g, g 1 , g 2 , H, u 1 , u 1,1 , . . . ,   u 1,n , u 2 , u 2,1 , . . . , u 2,n , u 3 , u 3,1 , . . . , u 3,n ) .
Considering an n-bit string ID, let V be the set of all i's for which the i-th bit of ID is 1, respectively, and then define three products
Extract(PK, MSK, ID). For an identity ID, randomly choose r ID ∈ Z p and set the user's private key
Encrypt(PK, ID, m, b = 0). Given PK, an identity ID, and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , randomly choose s ∈ Z p . First compute two n-bit strings C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) , and then compute
, and set the re-encryption key
If not, outputs ⊥, else randomly choose t ∈ Z p and compute
t , where
Then output the re-encrypted ciphertext
. Given PK, a ciphertext C ID 2 , an identity ID 2 , and his private key d
If not, output ⊥, else compute
.
Check whether b = 1 and
= e(g 1 , g 2 ) −s , also as required.
We have noticed that our scheme involves long public keys. This is due to the fact that the scheme is based on Waters' IBE scheme [5] . Nevertheless, [25] [26] independently suggested a modification to Waters' scheme to reduce the size of the public parameters, which is also applicable to our IBPRE scheme. In addition, the size of the public parameters can be further reduced by adopting the method introduced by Chatterjee and Sarkar [27] . We do not dwell on the reduction due to space concerns.
Security Proofs
The following two theorems show that our scheme is IND-ID-CCA secure in the standard model and achieves master secret security at the same time.
Theorem 3. The proposed IBPRE scheme is (t, q e , q rk , q re , q d , ) IND-ID-CCA secure, assuming the (t , )-DBDH assumption holds, where
Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, q e , q rk , q re , q d , )-IND-ID-CCA adversary A against the proposed IBPRE scheme. Then we show it is feasible to construct another probabilistic polynomial-time B that employs A to solve the DBDH problem with a probability of at least and in the time of at most t . The input for algorithm B is a random 5-tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , Z), which is either sampled from T β=1 (where Z = e(g, g) abc , recall Subsection 2.2) or from T β=0 (where Z ∈ R G T ). The output is 1 if Z = e(g, g) abc , otherwise 0. Algorithm B employs A to execute the following.
Setup. B assigns q 1 = q e + q rk + q re + q d and q 2 = q 3 = q d . For 1 i 3, B sets m i = 4q i , randomly chooses integer k i between 0 and n, randomly chooses x i and x i,1 , . . . , x i,n from Z mi , and randomly chooses y i and y i,1 , . . . , y i,n from Z p . We assume that m i (n + 1) < p, for 1 i 3.
Let ID be an n-bit string and V be the set of all i's for which the i-th bit of ID is 1. For 1 j 3, we define 
From the perspective of the adversary, the distribution of the public parameters is identical to the real construction. The master secret is g
ab which is unknown to B. All public parameters are then passed to A. B also maintains a CHK-list to validate the reencrypted ciphertext. Initially the list is empty.
• Extraction query on ID: if K 1 (ID) = 0, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit. Otherwise, B chooses a random r ∈ Z p . Using the technique described by Boneh and Boyen [3] , it constructs the private key
We also have d
L1(ID) = gr. Hence for the adversary, all private keys computed by B will be indistinguishable from the keys generated by a true challenger.
• RKGeneration query on (ID 1 , ID Let z = −a/x + z 1 , we have
2) Else if L 1 (ID 1 ) mod p = 0, B uses the same method in Extraction query to get the private key of ID, runs RKGen algorithm, and returns the result to A. Last, B computes vk ID 1 →ID2 and adds the record (ID 1 , ID 2 , vk ID 1 →ID2 ,C) to the CHK-list.
3) Else, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit.
• ReEncryption query on (ID 1 , ID 2 , C ID1 ): B uses the same method in RKGeneration query to get d ID 1 →ID2 , runs ReEncrypt algorithm, and returns the result to A.
• Decryption query on (ID 2 , C ID 2 ):
, and checks whether
, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit; -else B uses the same method in Extraction query to get
. Let
B first checks whether
where C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , C 7 , C 8 , C 9 ,C) . If not, B outputs ⊥, else B checks whether the record (ID 1 , ID 2 , vk ID 1 →ID2 ,C) is on the CHK-list and
If not, B outputs ⊥. Else B uses the same method in the first case to respond to A's query.
Indeed, for a well-formed re-encrypted ciphertext, we have
Challenge. The adversary A selects two plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ) of equal length, as well as a target identity ID * . If L 1 (ID * ) mod p = 0, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit. Otherwise, B flips a fair coin β ∈ {0, 1} and constructs the ciphertext as follows: 1) B computes
(This shows that C * 2 is well-formed.) 
(This shows that C * 4 is well-formed.) 
(This shows that C * 5 is well-formed.) g, g) abc . Otherwise, C * exhibits no information on B's choice of β.
Query Phase 2. A continues to adaptively issue queries as in Phase 1, and B responds as in Query Phase 1.
Guess. The adversary A outputs a bit β . Artificial Abort. The probability that B aborts in the query or challenge phase depends on the adversary's input. B corrects for this by forcing all possible sets of queries of the adversary to cause B to abort with (almost) the same probability. This is done by sampling the transcript of adversary's query and in certain cases aborting. The sampling procedure introduces the ex- [5, 27] into the simulator's runtime. Here λ is a lower bound on the probability that B does not abort before entering the artificial abort stage.
Output. If B has not aborted up to this stage, then it outputs 1 if β = β, else it outputs 0.
Analysis. It is obvious that the simulation is perfect. The probability of B not aborting before entering the artificial abort stage can be computed as in [5, 27] .
Theorem 4. The proposed identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme is (t, q e , q rk , ) master secret secure, assuming the (t , )-CDH assumption holds, where
where λ = 1 8qe(n+1) . Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, q e , q rk , ) MSS adversary A against our identity-based unidirectional PRE scheme. Then we show it is feasible to construct another probabilistic polynomial-time B that employs A to solve the CDH problem with a probability of at least and in the time of at most t . The input information for algorithm B is a group G, a generator g, and the elements g a and g b . The output is g ab . Algorithm B employs A to execute the following.
Setup. B sets m = 4q e , randomly chooses integer k between 0 and n, randomly chooses x 1 and x 1,1 , . . . , x 1,n from Z m , and randomly chooses y 1 and y 1,1 , . . . , y 1,n from Z p . We assume that m(n + 1) < p.
Let ID be an n-bit string and V be the set of all i's for which the i-th bit of ID is 1. We define . From the perspective of the adversary, the distribution of the public parameters is identical to the real construction. All public parameters are then passed to A.
• Extraction query on ID: If K 1 (ID) = 0, B aborts. Otherwise, B chooses a random r ∈ Z p . Using the technique described by Boneh and Boyen [3] , B constructs the private key d ID as L1(ID) = gr. Hence for the adversary, all private keys computed by B will be indistinguishable from the keys generated by a true challenger.
• RKGeneration query on (ID 1 , ID 2 ):
which is exactly the solution to the given CDH problem. Analysis. It is obvious that the simulation is perfect. The probability of B not aborting can be computed as in [5] .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented two new constructions that are both provably secure in the standard model. First, we explored the relationship between identity-based mediated encryption (IBmE) and identity-based unidirectional proxy re-encryption (IBPRE), and demonstrated how a secure IBmE scheme can be constructed from any secure IBPRE scheme and vice versa. Second, we imported the notion of master secret security (MSS) to IBPRE and accordingly presented a concrete IBPRE scheme, which not only is CCA-secure but also achieves the MSS property.
Concerning future research on IBPRE, an interesting open problem may be posed as follows. Our IBPRE scheme is not resilient to the "transfer of delegation" attack in that the proxy can collude with a set of colluding delegatees to re-delegate the decryption rights. In real applications, such conspiracy may violate the intended security policy. The design of an IBPRE scheme fur-ther secure against the "transfer of delegation" attack still seems to be a challenging task.
